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CANADA–USA B LATERAL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT IN THE GULF OF MAINE
Canada–USA Bilateral Fisheries 
Management in the Gulf of Maine: 
Under the Radar Screen
 
Emily J. Pudden and David L. VanderZwaag
 
Canada and the USA have developed a series of
cooperative initiatives that address transboundary
fisheries issues in the Gulf of Maine. The Canada–
USA Steering Committee serves as an umbrella forum
for discussing and coordinating transboundary
management measures. Through the work of the
Transboundary Resource Assessment Committee and
the Transboundary Management Guidance Committee,
the Steering Committee has overseen the development
of joint scientific stock assessments and a sharing
agreement for groundfish resources in the vicinity
of the eastern Georges Bank. The bilateral Fisheries
Enforcement Agreement helps ensure the success of
such cooperative management initiatives by combating
illegal fishing in the vicinity of the international bound-
ary. However, the largely informal ‘under the radar
screen’ arrangements, while positive on many fronts, to
date fall short of fully implementing key principles of
sustainable development, such as public participation,




In the 1970s, Canada and the USA extended their
offshore jurisdictions to 200 nautical miles and the
Gulf of Maine became the exclusive domain of the




 Although the two countries
periodically exchanged scientific information, their




Problems emerged as a result of this management
structure. The countries’ jurisdictional claims overlapped,




 area, at the eastern




 The disputed region was home to
several commercial groundfish species, including cod,
haddock and yellowtail flounder. Although the juris-
dictional issue was resolved, in October 1984, when the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) established the
international boundary between the two countries in




 the problem of managing Georges
Bank’s transboundary fisheries resources remained.
In the years following the ICJ decision, Canadian and
US fishing activities were confined to their respective





 Meanwhile, increased fishing
efforts on both sides of the boundary, throughout the





In response to this growing problem, Canada and the
USA developed a series of cooperative initiatives aimed
at addressing transboundary fisheries issues. The
Canada–USA Steering Committee was established,
in 1995, as an umbrella forum for discussing and
coordinating transboundary management measures
in the Gulf of Maine. Through the work of its various









 (Supp. 1976) established a US 200-mile fishery
conservation zone, effective from 1 March 1977; Proposed Fishing
Zones of  Canada (Zones 4 and 5) Order, P.C. 1977-1, 110 C. Gaz.,
Extra No 101 (Territorial Sea and Fishing Zone Act of  1964, R.S.C.
1970, c. T-7, am. by R.S.C. 1970 (1st Supp.), c. 45) established




 Transboundary Management Guidance Committee, 
 
Development
of  a Sharing Allocation Proposal for Transboundary Resources of
Cod, Haddock and Yellowtail Flounder on Georges Bank
 
, Fisheries
Management Regional Report 2002/01 (Fisheries and Oceans Canada










 G.J. Herbert, ‘Fisheries Relations in the Gulf  of  Maine:




(1995), 301, at 306. Georges Bank is a shallow submarine bank
located along the eastern boundary of  the Gulf  of  Maine, between




 ICJ 12 October 1984, 
 
Case Concerning Delimitation of  the Maritime
Boundary in the Gulf  of  Maine Area (Canada v. USA)
 
 [1984] ICJ
Rep. 246. However, it should be noted that the ICJ was not asked
to resolve the disputed boundary around Machias Seal Island and
negotiations between Canada and the USA have, to date, not been
successful in forging an agreement on the management of  lobster
resources in the disputed zone. For a detailed discussion of  the
ongoing dispute, which is beyond the scope of  this article, see T.A.
Cheney, 
 
Examination of  the Lobster Fishery in the Internationally
Disputed ‘Grey Zone’: History, Management and Options
 
, Unpublished
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Committee has overseen the development of joint
scientific stock assessments and a sharing agreement
for eastern Georges Bank groundfish, among other
schemes. The Fisheries Enforcement Agreement, adopted
by Canada and the USA in 1990, helps ensure the
success of such cooperative management initiatives
by combating illegal fishing in the vicinity of the inter-
national boundary.
However, as this article highlights, the largely informal
‘under the radar screen’ arrangements to date fall short
of fully implementing key principles of sustainable
development. These principles include public participa-





The Canada–USA Steering Committee is the oversight
body that guides transboundary management issues




 This informal advisory group
coordinates bilateral stock assessments and a sharing
scheme for transboundary groundfish resources through
the actions of the Transboundary Resource Assessment
Committee (TRAC) and the Transboundary Management
Guidance Committee (TMGC). The Steering Committee
supervises additional cooperative transboundary
initiatives in the Gulf of Maine via the Canada–USA
Integration Committee. The Steering Committee is
co-chaired by the Director-General for the Maritime
Region, Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO)
and the Northeast Regional Administrator of the US





members also include representatives of the New England
Fisheries Management Council (NEFMC), Canada’s
Gulf of Maine Advisory Committee (GOMAC), and





Committee meets bi-annually to discuss transboundary
resource management issues and the cooperative actions




Under the auspices of the Steering Committee, scientists
in Canada and the USA first compiled joint stock assess-
ments for Georges Bank cod, haddock and yellowtail
flounder in 1997. The success of this coordinated effort
led to the formation of a groundfish TRAC in 1998,
which combined stock assessment and peer review





 TRAC is co-chaired by representatives from
the NMFS and DFO. Since 2000, TRAC has served as




 TRAC members review
fishery, survey and biological data to evaluate the
status of cod, haddock and yellowtail populations on





The TMGC was established, in 2000, to provide Canadian
and US decision makers with non-binding advice on
the management of transboundary cod, haddock and
yellowtail flounder stocks in an effort to ensure the




The group is composed of two government and four




The committee is responsible for developing guidance
documents, such as harvest strategies and resource-
sharing approaches, for fisheries management author-




The Steering Committee’s TRAC/TMGC framework
continues to expand and will soon be applied to other
transboundary commercial fish species. A TRAC specific




 and work is progressing





 A TRAC and TMGC for mackerel have been





possibility of developing TRACs for halibut, dogfish




The most recent organizational development under the













’). It should be
noted that the Steering Committee operates within the context of
the broader cooperative relationship existing between Canada and
the USA. For example, officials from the Department of  Fisheries
and Oceans and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA) conduct annual informal consultations aimed at improving
bilateral communication and coordination on fisheries conservation
and management issues, including transboundary stocks in the Gulf
of  Maine. See Office of  International Affairs (OIA), 
 
International
Agreements Concerning Living Marine Resources of  Interest to
NOAA Fisheries
 
 (National Marine Fisheries Service, NOAA, 2006),













 (unpublished document on file with the












 (22 July 2006)
























 For a general overview of  the function and structure of  the TMGC,









 See Transboundary Management Guidance Committee,
Guidance Document 2005/01 (Fisheries and Oceans Canada and














 Email from G. Peacock, Executive Director, Federal/Provincial
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the approval of the Canada–USA Integration Committee




 The IC serves as the strategic
and operational arm of the Steering Committee, to




 The IC will
also provide a direct link to the TMGCs and the various





 The Species at Risk Working
Group, Habitat Working Group and Oceans Working
Group will report directly to the IC. IC membership
will be equally divided between Canada and the USA,




members from the TMGCs and working groups, to join




The IC’s mandate, as authorized by the Steering
Committee, is to assist in the integration of policies
and ensure consistency in approach across the TMGCs
and working groups. As part of this process, the IC will
provide recommendations to, and undertake record
keeping, archival, coordination and general secretariat






FORMULA FOR GULF OF 
MAINE GROUNDFISH
 
One of the first tasks undertaken by the groundfish
TMGC was the development of a resource-sharing
formula for allocating eastern Georges Bank cod,
haddock and yellowtail flounder stocks between the
USA and Canada. The Committee’s Sharing Allocation
Proposal recommends a common fishing mortality-
based US–Canadian harvest strategy for groundfish
resources in a management area corresponding to the
fishing unit areas 5Zj and 5Zm (5Zjm) for cod and
haddock stocks and unit areas 5Zhjmn for yellowtail




 The report provides recommen-
dations for determining resource distribution patterns
within this management area and sets out a transi-
tional schedule for proportionally allocating the stocks
between the two countries.
The Sharing Allocation Proposal represents a compro-
mise between the disparate sharing proposals initially
suggested on behalf of Canada and the USA. Both
countries conceded that the sharing agreement should
allocate groundfish stocks using a weighted formula
based on resource distribution patterns and past fisheries
landings. Canada favoured a greater emphasis on
resource distribution, to which it assigned a proposed
weighting of 95%, with historical utilization to be
weighted at 5%. The USA, on the other hand, argued
that equal emphasis should be placed on resource




The two countries eventually reached consensus on a
number of issues necessary for the development of the
resource-sharing formula. DFO fishing unit area 5Zjm
was agreed upon as the management unit for the
transboundary cod and haddock stocks. The parties
agreed that groundfish resource distribution patterns
would be calculated using data collected during the
three NMFS and DFO surveys carried out each year. A
compromise was also reached with regard to the time
period on which historical resource utilization patterns
would be based. The years 1967–1994 were selected in
order to exclude landings data from the period follow-
ing the collapse of the Georges Bank cod and haddock
stocks. Finally, the decision was made to develop a





The TMGC Sharing Formula incorporates a 7-year
transitional schedule with allocation percentages that
take into account both contemporary resource distri-
bution and historical utilization patterns (see box 1
below). The TMGC’s proposed method for determining
the proportion of groundfish stocks on either side of
the international boundary is designed to take into
account changes in resource distribution over time. The




 F.G. Peacock and G. Peters, 
 
Bilateral Management of  Transboundary
Fish Stocks: An Informal Approach to Ecosystem-Based Management
 
,
paper presented at the Sharing the Fish – Allocation Issues in Fisheries
Management 2006 Conference, Fremantle, Australia, March 2006,
available at <http://www.fishallocation.com/assets/pdf/papers/




























, n. 2 above. Fisheries and Oceans Canada’s
management area 5Zjm corresponds with the US NMFS’s statistical
fisheries units 551, 552, 561 and 562. Canadian unit area 5Zhjmn

















 Ibid., at 6.
FIGURE 1 GEORGES BANK FISHERIES MANAGE-
MENT UNITS27
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calculated annually, using the results of the NMFS’s
spring and autumn bottom trawl surveys and DFO’s
annual winter survey for the most recent 33 years. For
estimating yellowtail flounder distributions, a simple
average of the three surveys conducted each year is
employed, since this species does not exhibit marked
migration patterns. For cod and haddock, which migrate
seasonally, the TMGC proposed classifying the surveys
according to the time of year in which they were
conducted, to produce average distributions for both
the colder winter–spring half of the year and the warmer
summer–autumn half. These two seasonal distribu-
tion averages are then combined to produce a yearly
average. Finally, a statistical smoothing procedure is
applied to the averaged survey results to compensate
for any anomalies produced by statistical sampling
variation or natural, but unpredictable, fluctuations in
resource distribution. The resultant figure should rep-
resent a reliable near-term (1–3 years) estimate of
stock distributions, on either side of the Canada–USA




The historical utilization percentages used in the shar-
ing allocation formula are fixed values that have been
calculated based on fishery landings data from the




In the first year of the agreement, 2003, the sharing
formula assigned a weighting of 60% to resource distri-
bution and 40% to historic utilization. This weighting
ratio gradually shifts over the course of the 7-year
transition period until resource distribution is weighted






Each year, the TMGC publishes a Guidance Document
containing a summary of its recommendations to US





reports set out the resource allocation percentages to
be applied by each country in drafting their respective
fisheries management plans for the coming year.
Combined Canada–US Total Allowable Catch (TACs)
levels are suggested for eastern Georges Bank cod,
haddock and yellowtail flounder resources based on
the annual stock assessments compiled by TRAC. The
TMGC then applies the sharing allocation formula to
allocate proportionally each combined TAC between the
two countries’ fisheries. In addition to recommending
national quotas for the three groundfish species, the
Guidance Documents provide information on past
exploitation of these fisheries, the state of the resources
in terms of biomass indices, species productivity levels




OF THE SHARING 
ALLOCATION AGREEMENT
 
Although TRAC and the TMGC are international in
scope, the fisheries management recommendations
developed through these processes must be implemented
domestically. Canada and the USA continue to develop
and execute separate fisheries management plans. In
2003, Canada and the USA formally agreed to apply
the TMGC’s resource-sharing allocation formula for
Georges Bank cod, haddock and yellowtail flounder to




In Canada, authority over the fisheries is centralized
under the DFO. GOMAC was established by DFO in
1984 to serve as a government–industry forum for





 GOMAC is co-chaired by the Director-
General of the Scotia-Fundy Region of DFO and a senior





ship includes representatives from DFO, the Atlantic
provincial governments, the fishing industry, the
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade,




 The report recommends the application of a robust locally weighted









BOX 1 RESOURCE-SHARING ALLOCATION FORMULA
Formula:
% country share = αyear country utilization 
+ βyear resource distribution
where αyear = percentage weighting for utilization in year
βyear = percentage weighting for distribution in year







Percentage weighting (resource distribution/historical 
landings):
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010




 Guidance Documents for the years 2003–2006 are available on





















 For a general overview of the function and structure of  GOMAC, see
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DFO with consensus-based advice on transboundary
fisheries issues in the Gulf of Maine, including opera-





liaises with the TMGC, reviews stock status and
management assessments and recommends harvest
strategies for Gulf of Maine groundfish stocks to the




NEFMC is responsible for managing US fisheries in
the Gulf of Maine region. The council is composed of
18 voting members, which include representatives from
the NMFS, regional State governments and nominated




A further four non-voting members, representing the
US Coast Guard, the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries
Commission, the US Fish and Wildlife Service and the





North-East Multi-Species Fisheries Management Plan
outlines the management measures in place for a variety
of commercial finfish, including Georges Bank cod,




 The TMGC submits
its annual TAC recommendations to the NEFMC, for the
council’s consideration in the development of manage-





The success of any fisheries regime is dependent upon
the level of participant adherence to management
measures. Non-compliance with fisheries regulations
has been cited as a contributing factor in the over-





years following the Gulf of Maine boundary delineation,
numerous incidents of US vessels illegally fishing in





faced a number of difficulties in enforcement near the
international boundary. To be prosecuted in Canada,
vessels fishing illegally had to first be apprehended. By
staying near the boundary line, fishers were often able
to escape back across the border when a Canadian
patrol vessel was spotted. Even if charges happened to
be brought in the USA, the potential penalties under US
legislation were fairly insignificant in comparison with
the harsher Canadian laws. Canadian penalties included
CAN$100,000 fines, confiscation of catch, impoundment
of vessel and possible jail sentences. In comparison,




could be treated as a justifiable business expense.
 
46
1990 FISHERIES ENFORCEMENT 
AGREEMENT
 
In an effort to address the problem of illegal fishing,
Canada and the USA signed a reciprocal Fisheries





agreement obliges each country to enact domestic
prohibitions making it illegal for its nationals to violate
the fisheries laws and regulations of the other State




 As a result,
boundary violators fishing illegally in one country’s
waters now violate the laws of both countries. The
parties also committed to consultations with each
other regarding the implementation of the agreement,
including the effectiveness of penalties and fisheries





 Finally, the agreement obliges
Canada and the USA to make an effort to inform their
nationals, who fish in the vicinity of the boundary, as






Following the signing of the Fisheries Enforcement
Agreement, Canada and the USA implemented the
agreement through domestic laws, making it an offence
for non-authorized fishing in the other’s waters and





penalties for boundary violations have also been
synchronized to reflect the previous Canadian standards.
In addition, the two countries have held regular38 Ibid.
39 See Haddock Report, n. 7 above, at 14.
40 For a general overview of the function and structure of the NEFMC,
see the website available at <http://www.nefmc.org/about/index.html>.
See also P. Hoagland et al., Marine Area Governance and Management
in the Gulf  of  Maine: A Case Study (Marine Policy Center, Woods




41 See NEFMC website, ibid.
42 New England Fisheries Management Council, Fishery Management
Plan, Environmental Impact Statement, Regulatory Impact Review and
Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis for the Northeast Multi-Species
Fishery (NEFMC, August 1985), available at <http://www.nefmc.org/
nemulti/index.html> (‘Fishery Management Plan’).
43 See P. Hoagland et al., n. 40 above.
44 See G.J. Herbert, n. 3 above, at 301.
45 Lacey Act Amendments of  1981, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371–3378 (1982).
46 See G.J. Herbert, n. 3 above, at 314.
47 Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government
of  the United States of  America on Fisheries Enforcement (Ottawa,
26 September 1990).
48 Ibid., Article I.
49 Ibid., Article II.
50 Ibid.
51 The USA has implemented the agreement by issuing the
International Fisheries Regulations, USA–Canada Fisheries
Enforcement, 50 C.F.R. §§ 300.140–300.144; Canada implemented
the agreement with the USA Waters Fisheries Regulations, SOR/
91-660, revoked and subsumed by United States Waters Fisheries
Regulations, revocation Fishery (General) Regulations, amendment,
SOR/94-296.
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implementation meetings to review enforcement
practices and discuss the development of cooperative
standards, policies and strategies. Among the subjects
that have been addressed are prosecution practices,
evidentiary requirements, notification procedures, the
interpretation of regulations and hot pursuit.52 Canada
and the USA regularly cooperate in patrolling the
areas on either side of the Gulf of Maine boundary to
deter illegal fishing activities and monitor compliance
with applicable regulations. Fisheries surveillance
operations take the form of sea patrols, including on-
board inspections of fishing vessels, and aerial over-
flights. A more recent technique for monitoring vessel
catch locations is the use of vessel monitoring systems
(VMS), which apply satellite technology to monitor
harvesting operations electronically.53 To help ensure a
coordinated approach to fisheries enforcement on both
sides of the border, the NMFS Office for Law Enforcement
meets regularly with its counterparts in DFO to exchange
enforcement information. Data-sharing is also facilitated
by both countries’ memberships in the International
Network for the Cooperation and Coordination of
Fisheries-Related Monitoring Control and Surveillance
Activities (‘MCS Network’).54
EFFECT OF COOPERATIVE 
ENFORCEMENT AND 
MANAGEMENT ON BOUNDARY 
VIOLATIONS
DFO records detailing the incidence of boundary
violations in the Gulf of Maine from 1988 to 2006
demonstrate the positive effect of the Fisheries Enforce-
ment Agreement, and the cooperative fisheries manage-
ment measures implemented by Canada and the USA,
in reducing illegal fishing. Violation numbers, which
had been on the rise in the years following the maritime
boundary delineation, peaked in 1989.55 Increased levels
of cross-border cooperation, coinciding with the signing
of the Enforcement Agreement, contributed to the sub-
stantial drop in recorded incidents of illegal fishing from
1990.56 A further decrease in boundary violation
numbers occurred from 1994, following the two countries’
joint commitment to reduce fishing levels and rebuild
stocks in the Gulf of Maine.57
Boundary violations by US scallopers declined when
the NEFMC closed large areas of the US portion of
Georges Bank to multi-species fishing activities, in
December 1994, in an effort to restore declining
groundfish populations.58 Among the closed zones was
a section bordering a significant length of the Gulf of
Maine boundary, designated as Closed Area II. Since
June 1999, the southern part of this closed area has
been re-opened, as a controlled access area, to allow
limited scallop harvesting operations to take place.59
Fishing activities within this area have been closely
monitored, however, through the use of surveillance
patrols, on-board observers and the electronic reporting
of catches.60 There has been no recorded increase in
illegal transboundary fishing in this region since the
limited re-opening.61 This management regime has
likely helped reduce the number of boundary violations
committed by US scallop vessels on Georges Bank.62
Boundary violations by groundfish fishers were less
of a problem in the years preceding the Enforcement
Agreement, as these stocks were in decline on both sides
of the border. In such cases, the risk of being caught did
not justify potential rewards from fishing illegally.63 In
addition, Closed Area II, on the US side of the Gulf of
Maine boundary line, has continued to remain closed to
groundfish fishing operations. The cooperative manage-
ment of groundfish resources by Canada and the USA,
through the Sharing Allocation Agreement, is also seen
as an important factor in the prevention of current and




The forging of informal cooperative fisheries management
arrangements for the Gulf of Maine region is positive
on many fronts. The arrangements have established ‘good
neighbourly relations’ in place of previous conflicts
and tensions over the allocation of shared groundfish
52 See OIA, n. 7 above, at 109–110.
53 J.K. Randall, ‘Improving Compliance in US Federal Fisheries: An
Enforcement Agency Perspective’, 35:4 Ocean Devel. & Int’l L.
(2004), 287.
54 See OIA, n. 7 above, at 110.
55 Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO), USA Transboundary Violations
Canada/USA Boundary Line (unpublished document on file with
DFO, undated) (‘Transboundary Violations’).
56 See G.J. Herbert, n. 3 above, at 315.
57 See Transboundary Violations, n. 55 above.
58 D. Hart, Status of  Fishery Resources off  the Northeastern United
States: Sea Scallops (Northeast Fisheries Science Center (NEFSC),
National Marine Fisheries Service, 2001), available at <http://
www.nefsc.noaa.gov/sos/spsyn/ iv/scallop/>.
59 New England Fisheries Management Council, Framework Adjustment
18 to the Atlantic Sea Scallop FMP: Including an Environmental
Assessment, Regulatory Impact Review, Regulatory Flexibility
Analysis and Stock Assessment and Fishery Evaluation (SAFE)
Report (NEFMC, 2005), at 3-1, available at <http://www.nefmc.org/
scallops/> (‘Framework Adjustment 18’).
60 See D. Hart, n. 58 above.
61 Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO), Canada/USA Enforcement
Treaty – Since 1991: Vessel Occurrences – Canada/USA Boundary
– Atlantic Coast (database maintained by Conservation and Protection
Branch, DFO Maritimes).
62 Personal communication with G. Peacock, Executive Director,
Federal/Provincial Relations, DFO Maritimes (19 July 2006).
63 See G.J. Herbert, n. 3 above, at 312.
64 See personal communication with G. Peacock, n. 62 above.
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stocks.65 While international law in relation to equitable
sharing of transboundary resources is still limited,66
with equity being an open-textured concept subject to
varying interpretations,67 Canadian and US officials have
been able to reach a creative allocation accommodation,
with geographical distribution of the groundfish stock
being phased in as the increasingly dominant factor.
The shift from historical catch emphasis to the geo-
graphical distribution of fish stocks in national waters
could be exemplary to other States of how equitable
sharing might be approached. The two countries can be
viewed as marching in step with the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea68 and its mandate
that where fish stocks are shared across exclusive
economic zones, countries are required to seek directly
or through sub-regional or regional organizations to agree
upon necessary measures to conserve and develop
shared stocks.69 Scientific and bureaucratic cooperation
has been achieved without high costs of administration
and formalized structures.70 Federal officials took on a
difficult task that was beyond the mandate and com-
petence of the Gulf of Maine Council on the Marine
Environment established in 1989.71
However, various aspects of the bilateral ‘under the
radar’ arrangements may be characterized as falling
short of modernization trends in ocean governance driven
by sustainable development principles,72 in particular
public participation, the ecosystem approach, integra-
tion and precaution. Perhaps the greatest criticism is
the ‘closed club’ approach, whereby industry and
government representatives, supported with scientific
advice, have controlled fisheries management recom-
mendations. The Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO) Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries,73
meant to guide both national and regional fisheries
management approaches,74 urges States to broaden
participation to include environmental and other
interested organizations.75
The informal arrangements also appear to fall short of
implementing the ecosystem approach,76 sometimes
equated with ecosystem-based management.77 While
the ecosystem approach is still an evolving concept78
and brims with various uncertainties,79 the approach
does suggest some fundamental fisheries management
shifts that have not yet been fully embraced under the
informal USA–Canada cooperative arrangements. Those
shifts include considering fish harvesting impacts on
associated species and marine biodiversity,80 and sub-
jecting proposed commercial scale fisheries to ecological
impact assessments.81 Canadian and US fisheries
65 For reviews of  the rocky relations over fisheries including a failure
to adopt a negotiated 1979 East Coast Fisheries Agreement, see
D.L. VanderZwaag, The Fish Feud: The US and Canadian Boundary
Dispute (Lexington Books, 1983); L.J. Prelli and M. Larsen-Becker,
‘Learning from the Limits of  an Adjudicatory Strategy for Resolving
United States–Canada Fisheries Conflicts: Lessons from the Gulf  of
Maine’, 41:2 Nat. Resources J. (2001), 445.
66 While the equitable utilization principle has been quite well developed
in international watercourse law, the meaning of  equitable sharing in
other transboundary resource areas, such as hydrocarbon and mineral
deposits, clean air, fisheries and endangered species is less clear.
See, e.g., P.G. Cameron, ‘The Rules of Engagement: Developing Cross-
Border Petroleum Deposits in the North Sea and the Caribbean’,
55:3 ICLQ (2006), 559; S.C. McCaffrey, ‘Book Review of  “Sharing
Transboundary Resources: International Law and Optimal Resource
Use” by Eyal Benvenisti’, 17:3 Emory Int’l L. Rev. (2003), 1091; and
R.E. Hall, ‘Transboundary Groundwater Management: Opportunities
under Law for Groundwater Management in the United States–Mexico
Border Region’, 21:3 Ariz. J. Int’l & Comp. L. (2004), 873.
67 For six of  the most common conceptions of  fairness and equity,
see P.G. Harris, ‘The European Union and Environmental Change:
Sharing the Burdens of  Global Warming’, 17:2 Colo. J. Int’l Envtl L.
& Pol’y (2006), 309.
68 United Nations Convention on the Law of  the Sea (Montego Bay,
10 December 1982).
69 Ibid., Article 63(1) (emphasis added).
70 See personal communication with G. Peacock , n. 62 above.
71 The Governors of  Maine, Massachusetts and New Hampshire and
Premiers of  New Brunswick and Nova Scotia signed the Agreement
on Conservation of  the Marine Environment of  the Gulf  of  Maine
between the Governments of  the Bordering States and Provinces in
1989, printed in Gulf  of  Maine Council on the Marine Environment,
The Gulf  of  Maine Action Plan 1991–2000 (GoMCME, 1991), Appendix.
State and provincial leaders reaffirmed their commitment to the wise
management of  the Gulf  of  Maine and its watershed in the Gulf  of
Maine Council’s Action Plan 2001–2006: Gulf of Maine Council on the
Marine Environment, Action Plan 2001–2006 (GoMCME, 2002), at 6.
72 See D.R. Rothwell and D.L. VanderZwaag, ‘The Sea Change
Towards Principled Oceans Governance’, in D.R. Rothwell and
D.L. VanderZwaag (eds), Towards Principled Oceans Governance:
Australian and Canadian Approaches and Challenges (Routledge,
2006), 3. See also, D.R. Christie, ‘It Don’t Come EEZ: The Failure
and Future of  Coastal State Fisheries Management’, 14:1 J.
Transnat’l. L. & Pol’y (2004), 1.
73 Food and Agriculture Organization, Code of  Conduct for
Responsible Fisheries (FAO, 1995) (‘FAO Code’).
74 Ibid., Article 2.
75 Ibid., Article 7.1.6.
76 See FAO Fisheries Department, The Ecosystem Approach to
Fisheries, FAO Technical Guidelines for Responsible Fisheries No
4, Suppl. 2 (FAO, 2003); Food and Agriculture Organization, Putting
into Practice the Ecosystem Approach To Fisheries (FAO, 2005).
77 For a review of  ecosystem-based management, see S.J. Hall and
B. Bainprize, ‘Towards Ecosystem-Based Management’, 5:1 Fish and
Fisheries (2004), 1. The FAO has preferred the term ‘ecosystem
approach’ to be consistent with use of  the term ‘precautionary
approach’ and to ensure fisheries objectives are given due weight.
See S.M. Garcia et al., The Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries: Issues,
Terminology, Principles, Institutional Foundations, Implementation and
Outlook, FAO Fisheries Technical Paper No 443 (FAO, 2003), at 6.
78 For recent international discussions on the ecosystem approach,
see Report on the Work of  the United Nations Open-Ended Informal
Consultative Process on Oceans and Law of  the Sea at its Seventh
Meeting (UN Doc. A/61/156, 17 July 2006), available at <http://
www.un.org/Depts/los/consultative_process/consultative_process.
htm#A/61/156>.
79 See D.R. Rothwell and D.L. VanderZwaag, n. 72 above, at 6.
80 FAO Fisheries Department, n. 76 above, at 13.
81 See D.R. Rothwell and D.L. VanderZwaag, n. 72 above. The scope
of  the called-for environmental impact assessment may be subject
to debate in light of  the FAO Code of  Conduct’s recommendation
that prior impact assessment be undertaken before a new fishery is
developed or a new technology is deployed (Articles 8.4.7 and
12.11). See FAO Fisheries Department, n. 76 above, at 82.
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managers have followed a ‘sectoral fixation’ of recom-
mending catch allocations for three target groundfish
species. Single-stock assessments, rather than consid-
eration of ecosystem inter-relationships, have been
the norm.82
However, aspects of the ecosystem approach have been
adopted or are in the process of adoption in national
management systems.83 For example, the USA does
subject proposed fisheries management plans to environ-
mental impact assessment;84 while Canada, through its
National Oceans Strategy,85 calls for implementation of
the ecosystem approach where maintaining ecological
integrity and health are overall goals.86
The over-arching Canada–USA Steering Committee
framework has the potential to guide the TRAC and
TMGC processes towards broader ecosystem considera-
tions. Working Groups on Endangered Species and
Marine Habitat, which feed advice into the Canada–
USA Integration Committee, hold promise, but it
remains to be seen how fisheries interests and marine
biodiversity values are handled in practice.
Placing fisheries management within an integrated
planning framework, also urged by the FAO Code of
Conduct,87 remains an unmet goal for the Gulf of Maine.
A fragmented array of transboundary cooperative
initiatives and arrangements exist.88 The most central
cooperative arrangement, the Gulf of Maine Council
on the Marine Environment, has largely supported
cooperative projects, meetings and workshops, but
has not played an integrated planning role and has
distanced itself from fisheries management issues.89
Recent establishment by the Conference of New
England Governors and Eastern Canadian Premiers
of an Oceans Working Committee may hold some
integration promise, but the initiative could also add
another layer of complexity.90
The Canada–USA Integration Committee, although its
name may suggest an integrative planning function,
does not include key ‘players’. Local governments,
indigenous groups and non-governmental organizations
are not participants. Participation by provincial/State
officials is not ensured.
While Section 31 of Canada’s Oceans Act91 requires the
Minister of Fisheries and Oceans to lead and facilitate
the development and implementation of integrated
management plans for all activities in or affecting Canada’s
estuaries, coastal waters and marine waters, planning
efforts to date have focused on marine areas within
Canada.92 The initial five large ocean management
areas selected for integrated planning implementation
do not include transboundary mandates.93
Application of the precautionary approach within the
informal bilateral cooperative arrangements has also
not been explicit.94 With no over-arching bilateral fisheries
management or regional ocean governance agreement in
place, principles for cooperative management and practical
implementation implications have not been fleshed out.95
The TMGC’s Guidance Documents, although at times
supporting risk-adverse groundfish quotas, have also
advocated, on occasion, risk-neutral and above TACs.
For example, in its 2006 Guidance Document for the
2007 fishing year, the TMGC recommended a TAC for
82 See Transboundary Management Guidance Committee, Guidance
Document 2006/01 (Fisheries and Oceans Canada and NOAA
Fisheries, 2006), available at <http://www.mar.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/science/
tmgc/publications/GD2006_1_E.pdf> (‘Guidance Document 2006/01’).
83 For reports on Canadian and US initiatives, see G. Jamieson and
C-I. Zhang (eds), Report of  the Study Group on Ecosystem-Based
Management Science and its Application to the North Pacific, PICES
Scientific Report No 29 (North Pacific Marine Science Organization
(PICES), 2005).
84 See Fishery Management Plan, n. 42 above; Framework Adjustment
18, n. 59 above.
85 Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO), Canada’s Oceans Strategy:
Our Oceans, Our Future (DFO, 2002).
86 Ibid., at 4 and 12.
87 FAO Code, n. 73 above, Article 10.
88  See ACZISC Secretariat and Marine and Environmental Law
Institute, Dalhousie University, Overview of  Current Governance in the
Bay of  Fundy/Gulf  of  Maine: Transboundary Collaborative Arrangements
and Initiatives, Report prepared for Fisheries and Oceans Canada
(2006), forthcoming at <http://www.dal.ca/law/melaw>.
89 See D.L. VanderZwaag, ‘Transboundary Challenges and Cooperation
in the Gulf  of  Maine Region: Riding a Restless Sea Toward Misty
Shores’, in H.N. Scheiber (ed.), Law of  the Sea: The Common Heritage
and Emerging Challenges (Martinus Nijhoff, 2000), 265, at 277.
90 Pursuant to Resolution 29-3, adopted at the Twenty-Ninth Annual
Conference of  the New England Governors and Eastern Canadian
Premiers in 2005, the committee is to facilitate the exchange of
information, cooperate on marine research and development initiatives,
and address environmental and management issues. See New
England Governors’ Conference, Inc. (NEGC), XVIII:2 NEGC Update
(September 2005), at 3.
91 Oceans Act S.C. 1996, c. 31.
92 See Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO), Policy and Operational
Framework for Integrated Management of  Estuarine, Coastal and
Marine Environments in Canada (DFO, 2002).
93 The five priority areas include Placentia Bay and the Grand
Banks, the Scotian Shelf, the Gulf  of  St Lawrence, the Beaufort Sea
and the Pacific North Coast. See Fisheries and Oceans Canada
(DFO), Canada’s Oceans Action Plan: For Present and Future
Generations (DFO, 2005), at 13–15.
94 For overviews of  the precautionary principle/approach, see S.
Marr, The Precautionary Principle in the Law of  the Sea: Modern
Decision Making in International Law (Brill, 2003); and D. Freestone
and E. Hey (eds), The Precautionary Principle in International Law:
The Challenge of  Implementation (Kluwer Law International, 1996).
95 For reviews of how national systems have approached precaution,
see M. Territo, ‘The Precautionary Principle in Marine Fisheries
Conservation and the US Sustainable Fisheries Act of  1996’, 24:4
Vt. L. Rev. (2000), 1351 and D.L. VanderZwaag et al., ‘Canada and the
Precautionary Principle/Approach in Ocean and Coastal Management:
Wading and Wandering in Tricky Currents’, 34:1 Ottawa L. Rev.
(2002–2003), 117. For an overview of  approaches to fisheries
management, including the precautionary approach, see H.N. Scheiber,
‘Ocean Governance and the Marine Fisheries Crisis: Two Decades
of  Innovation – and Frustration’, 20:1 Va. Envtl. L.J. (2001), 119.
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eastern Georges Bank cod of 1900 metric tonnes (mt)
to be risk adverse to exceeding the fishing mortality level
agreed upon.96 For eastern Georges Bank haddock, a risk-
neutral approach was followed whereby a 19,000 mt
TAC was recommended with a 50% chance of exceed-
ing the fishing mortality reference agreed to.97 The
combined Canada/USA Georges Bank yellowtail
flounder TAC was recommended to be 1500 mt, slightly
above a risk-neutral level.98
CONCLUSION
While Canada and the USA have made substantial strides
through informal bilateral fisheries arrangements for
the Gulf of Maine region, putting integrated transbound-
ary ecosystem management into practice still seems a
distant goal. Canada and the USA, while being advanced
industrialized States with major scientific and organiza-
tional capacities, in many ways are lagging behind other
regions of the globe in modernizing and formalizing
transboundary ocean relations.99 Like the Gulf of Maine
Council on the Marine Environment, the informal
fisheries arrangements might be described as nascent.100
Reaching an integrated ocean governance system for
the Gulf of Maine may require all arrangements to be
viewable on a ‘unified radar screen’. Formalizing the
existing array of fragmented cooperative arrangements
under a comprehensive regional agreement umbrella is
one navigational option with various routes possible.101
Moving swiftly towards more formalized arrange-
ments does not seem likely in light of ‘missing ingredi-
ents’. Political interest and leadership supportive of
negotiating a new ocean agreement or agreements is
presently lacking. Champions of the cause have not
stepped forward and been vocal.
Even if agreement could be reached on the need to
strengthen regional transboundary cooperation in treaty
form, difficult details would have to be sorted out.
Those devilish details include, among others, the
geographical scope of coverage; the breadth of ocean
development and management issues to be addressed;
incorporation of strong versus weak versions of sustain-
ability principles; institutional structures; federal, State
and provincial roles; advisory versus decision-making
functions; relationships with existing organizations and
programmes having interests or relevance to the Gulf
of Maine; a financial mechanism or mechanisms; and
dispute-resolution provisions.
While the voyage towards integrated ecosystem
management arguably has a long way to go, Canada
and the USA continue to steer their bows in the right
direction. Good neighbourly ocean relations are being
kept alive and incrementally progressing largely under
the radar screen of informal arrangements.
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